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THE REAFFIRMATION OF
PROPORTIONALITY ANALYSIS UNDER
SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT t
Marci A. Hamilton*
David Schoenbrod**
In recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has made
clear that Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment extends only to provide remedies proportional to
violations of the rights incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment, and not to enlarge those rights.1 When this principle
was explicitly reinforced in the past few years, some scholars
expressed surprise at this proportionality requirement, viewing it
as a departure from precedent.' However, the cases-Florida
Prepaid Post-Secondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank3 and City of Boerne v. Flores4-provide a clear
' Copyright 1999 Marci A. Hamilton and David Schoenbrod. Professor Hamilton
was lead counsel for the City of Boerne, Texas, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997). The authors thank David I. Levine, Henry P. Monaghan, Peter H. Schuck, and
Harry H. Wellington for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article and Michael
Wickersham, Peter Yu, Doug Landon, Zaharah Markoe, Arti Tandon, Mark Atlee, and
Sena Kim-Reuter for their research assistance.
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
** Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1 See Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S.
Ct. 2199, 2206 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997); see also Alden v.
Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2267 (1999).
2 The first case in the modern era to emphasize the proportionality requirement was
Boerne, which invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA").
Those who expressed surprise included prominent defenders of the RFRA. See Protecting
Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of
Professor Douglas Laycock) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary>; id. (testimony of Marc D.
Stern, American Jewish Congress) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary> (transcript on file
with author); see also Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of
City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997). Others have expressed surprise
as well. See, e.g., Robert F. Drinan S.J., Essay, Reflections on the Demise of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 86 GEO. L.J. 101 (1997); Bernard Schwartz, A Presidential
Strikeout, Federalism, RFRA, Standing, and a Stealth Court, 33 TULSA L.J. 77 (1997); Mary
Ann Glendon, Religious Freedom and Common Sense, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1997, at All.
3 119 S.Ct. 2199 (1999).

CARDOZO LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 21:469

expression of time-honored constitutional and remedial principles
that long have limited Congress's power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Boerne, as the first modern reiteration of this
principle, was a surprise only to the extent that proportionality
principles had receded from the forefront of the Court's
explanations for its holdings. Yet, the Court never rejected the
principle in its Section 5 cases. The proportionality principle is an
important element of the Court's jurisprudence, as statutes, both
old and new, will stand or fall on it. 5 The purpose of this Article is

to trace the lineage from which the Court's proportionality
analysis in Boerne and College Savings Bank sprang.
The Boerne Court invalidated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA").6 The sponsors of that statute
set out to correct what they viewed as the Supreme Court's
erroneous interpretation of the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause in Employment Division v. Smith.7 RFRA established a
competing standard of review in all cases where generally
applicable, neutral laws substantially burden religious conduct.8
The new, stricter standard, which was to be applied in every
circumstance and against every government actor, provided the
most expansive protection for religious conduct in this country's
history.' Congress claimed to have enacted RFRA under the
authority granted to it in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the
Amendment]." 10 The Boerne Court held that legislation enacted
4

521 U.S. 507 (1997)

5 See, e.g., The Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999 ("RLPA"), H.R. 1691, 105th

Cong. (1999) (attempting to federalize local land use law applied to religious properties
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Alsbrook v. Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999,
1006-08 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding Title II Americans with Disabilities Act invalid under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
6 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
7 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to § 2000bb-4 (1994).
9 Some have attempted to argue that RFRA was simply a "restoration" of the law
before Smith. The Court in Boerne explicitly rejected such subterfuge. See Boerne, 521
U.S. at 534-35 ("[T]he Act imposes in every case a least restrictive means requirement-a
requirement that was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to
codify."). Additionally, RFRA could not have been a simple "restoration" of the law
before Smith, because the Court acknowledged that RFRA's "stringent test" reflected a
"lack of proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end
to be achieved" while the "substantial costs RFRA exact[ed] ... far exceed[ed] any
pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as
interpreted in Smith." See id.
10U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Only two scholars have addressed the issue of
Congress's power to enact such a statute. See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
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under Section 5 must be aimed at remedying violations of the
Amendment's provisions." RFRA failed this test because the
statute was not a proportional response to any threats to free
exercise rights identified by Congress. As the Court explained:
"While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial
measures, there must be a congruence between the means used
and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial
12
measures must be considered in light of the evil presented.'
Seven Justices explicitly endorsed this reasoning, and no Justice
disagreed.13
In College Savings Bank, the Court reaffirmed its allegiance
to the proportionality requirement and elaborated on the Boerne
Court's discussion of it, stating "that for Congress to invoke § 5, it
must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to
remedying or preventing such conduct." 4 In College Savings
Bank, the bank procured a patent for its college financing
methodology,15 and claimed that the Educational Expense Board
directly and indirectly infringed its patent. 6 The Court held that
the bank could not prevail under the Patent and Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act ("PVPRCA") because the
Act exceeded Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." In reaching its conclusion that the PVPRCA was
not a valid exercise of Section 5, the Court embraced two
predicates under Section 5: (1) there must be proof of pervasive
unconstitutional conduct in the states; and (2) the remedy
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 372, 372-94 (1992) (testimony of Professor Ira
Lupu) (arguing that RFRA may be unconstitutional as applied to the states); see also id. at
116, 124 (testimony of Bruce Fein) (suggesting that Congress may not have the
constitutional authority to enact RFRA); The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990:
Hearings on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 78 (1990) (letter from Professor Douglas
Laycock) (arguing for the constitutionality of RFRA as applied to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
11 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527.
12 Id. at 530. The Court held that RFRA failed this test, stating that "RFRA cannot be
considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning.
RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot
be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." Id. at
532.
13 The Justices who explicitly endorsed this reasoning were Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Stevens, Thomas, Ginsburg, and O'Connor. See id. at 530;
id. at 545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
14 College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2207.
15 See id. at 2203.
16 See id.
P7 See id. at 2209.
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redressing such unconstitutional actions must be proportional to
the constitutional harm posed.18
The Court's proportionality analysis is rooted in bedrock
constitutional principles and leaves Congress ample power to
enforce, but not to amend, constitutional rights. This Article
delineates three explanations for the limits identified in Boerne
First, such a proportionality
and College Savings Bank.
requirement was an essential component of constitutional tradition
long before Boerne. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,1 9 the Court
included dictum giving Congress more power, but the Boerne
Court chose to reject this newly introduced element and to follow
the weight of the case law. Second, the scope of Congress's power
under Section 5 to enforce the rights incorporated in the
Fourteenth Amendment draws its content from the law of
remedies, which requires that the remedy respond proportionally
to the wrong done or threatened. Third, the proportionality
requirement is consistent with the Court's close attention to the
Constitution's structural protections of liberty and democracy
inherent in the separation of powers and federalism. 0 College
Savings Bank and Boerne are further evidence of the Court's
increasing willingness to protect the Constitution's structure.
I.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW AND SECTION

5 JURISPRUDENCE

According to the Supreme Court and the plain language of
the Constitution, Section 5 grants Congress the authority only to
"enforce" the constitutional provisions incorporated in the
Fourteenth Amendment." Because Section 5 grants the power to
enforce law, it presupposes the existence of a law to be enforced
(in this case constitutional law). It also presupposes a violation, or
likely violation, of that law that necessitates its enforcement.22
Such enforcement may extend to preventing nascent constitutional
violations, but Congress is nonetheless limited to enforcing
See id. at 2206-07.
19 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
20 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid PostSecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999); Clinton v. City
of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
21 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have power
to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend
XIV, § 5; see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
22 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267 (discussing Boerne); College Say. Bank, 119 S. Ct. at
2224 (same); Florida Prepaid,119 S. Ct. at 2206-07 (same).
18
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constitutional rights. It may not redefine them.23 It also may not
enforce those rights without evidence of constitutional
24
wrongdoing.
Proportionality review requires that the means fit the end, the
means being legislation and the end being enforcement of the
Fourteenth Amendment's constitutional proscriptions. As early as
McCulloch v. Maryland,25 the Court stated: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that
end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit
26
constitutional.
are
of the constitution,
The requirement of a means-end fit had a secure place in
Section 5 jurisprudence even before Boerne. The Court has
27
applied proportionality reasoning in a variety of Section 5 cases.
The Court's earliest treatment of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment turns on the proportionality requirement. In the
Civil Rights Cases, the Court stated that remedial legislation under
Section 5 "should be adapted to the mischief and wrong which the
[Fourteenth] [A]mendment was intended to provide against '28 and
held that, because the legislation under scrutiny was not adapted
to remedy a state constitutional violation, no authority for its
passage could be derived from the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendments. 29 The Boerne decision relied on the Civil Rights
Cases, and on succeeding enforcement cases, to explain the
proportionality test applied to invalidate RFRA. 0 In fact, the
proportionality requirement has been a staple of the Section 5
cases. However, the Court has applied it with varying degrees of
vigor.

See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527.
See id. at 524, 532 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13-14, 15 (1883)).
25 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
26 Id. at 421; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978)
(citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 316); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966)
(same); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (same); Heart of Atlanta
Hotel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 276 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (same).
27 The Boerne decision itself cites to a variety of previous decisions in which the Court
had used either explicit or implicit proportionality reasoning. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530
(referring to South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 334 (1966)); id. at 532
(referring to City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980)); id. (referring to The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13).
28 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13.
29 See id. at 14, 25.
30 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-33.
23

24
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Katzenbach v. Morgan and Other Section 5 Cases

The leading case on which RFRA's supporters rested their
hopes was Katzenbach v. Morgan.3" In Boerne, the city argued that
Morgan could be interpreted as containing two threads: one
permitting Congress to enforce constitutional rights; the other
permitting Congress to create new constitutional rights.32 The
Boerne Court snipped the latter thread, explaining that such an
interpretation is not necessary, preferable, or consistent with the
vast majority of prior case law.33 Thus, the Boerne Court
embraced one theory of Morgan but explicitly rejected the other
to announce that Congress must have evidence of unconstitutional
activity and that its remedy must be proportional.
Justice Harlan, in his Morgan dissent, took the Court to task
for upholding a federal law prohibiting state literacy requirements
as applied to voters educated in Puerto Rico, on the ground that
the record in Congress was bare: "There is simply no legislative
record supporting such hypothesized discrimination of the sort we
have hitherto insisted upon when congressional power is brought
to bear on constitutionally reserved state concerns."34 Harlan's
point was that evidence of unconstitutional action by the states is a
necessary prerequisite for proportionality review. In the absence
of evidence of state wrongdoing, Harlan would have struck down
the federal law. Harlan's reading was consistent with the earlier
and later Section 5 cases, and made the holding in Morgan
questionable. While the Court in Boerne went out on a limb to
make clear that it was not overruling any previous Section 5
holding, its reassertion of the proportionality principle weakened
the precedential value of the reasoning in Morgan. The Court
plainly rejected a broad reading of Morgan."
While the Morgan decision gave short shrift to the
proportionality requirement, however, it did not openly reject it.
The rhetoric in Morgan strongly implied that the law would have
passed the proportionality requirement even under intermediate
or strict scrutiny.36 The Court found that the means chosen were
based on a "plain" empirical foundation clearly relevant to the end
sought.37 The foundation was, in fact, so plain that "[a]ny contrary
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
See Brief for Petitioners at 27, 31-33, City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(No. 95-2074).
33 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-29.
34 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 669.
35 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529-34.
31
32

36

See generally Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648-58.

37

See id. at 653.
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conclusion would require [the Court] to be blind to the realities
familiar to the legislators."3 8 Having determined that the means
were based on a plain foundation and the end was surely
legitimate, the Court upheld the law. The Boerne Court stated
that the same conclusion could be reached concerning the laws at
issue39 in City of Rome v. United States,40 Oregon v. Mitchell,4 and
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,42 where the "Court continued to
acknowledge the necessity of using strong remedial and preventive
measures to respond to the widespread and persisting deprivation
of constitutional rights. '43 Thus, the claim that the Court has
employed mere rationality review of proportionality in its Section
5 jurisprudence is not borne out by the analysis or rhetoric of its
Section 5 cases.44
B.

Fullilove v. Klutznick

41

The Supreme Court's decision in Fullilove has been cited for
the proposition that Congress has expansive power under Section
5 to do whatever it pleases to remedy violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and therefore Congress does not labor under a
proportionality requirement. 46 This is an overreading of the
amalgam of opinions in Fullilove, most of which directly addressed
and embraced a proportionality requirement.
The Fullilove plurality opinion, written by Chief Justice
Burger, and joined by Justices White and Powell, characterized the
Minority Business Enterprise program ("MBE"), which set aside
ten percent of federal funds for public works projects for
businesses owned by minorities, as "a limited and properly tailored
remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination. '47 Justice
Powell concurred, stating that the appropriate test in the Section 5
arena is whether the "means selected are equitable and reasonably
Id.
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533
40 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
41 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
42 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
43 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 526.
44 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 2, at 165-66.
45 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion).
46 See Mary C. Daly, Rebuilding the City of Richmond: Congress's Power to Authorize
the States to Implement Race-Conscious Affirmative Action Plans, 33 B.C. L. REV. 903,
935-38 (1992); Matt Pawa, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can
Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1029, 1071-72 (1993); see also Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet,
56 MONT. L. REV. 145, 164 & n.94 (1995).
47 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 450 (plurality opinion).
38
39
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necessary to the redress of identifiable discrimination. '48 Justice
Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, who also
voted to uphold the program, declared that the scheme was
"substantially related to achievement of [its] objectives. 49 The
issue of proportionality, or means-end fit, was dispositive for
Justice Stevens in Fullilove, whose solitary dissent rested on the
ground that the MBE set-aside was not "a 'narrowly tailored'
racial classification because it simply raise[d] too many serious
questions that Congress failed to answer or even to address in a
responsible way."50 Only Justices Stewart and Rehnquist did not
explicitly visit the proportionality issue, because they viewed the
racial classification as violative of an absolute constitutional
prohibition against race-based lawmaking.1 Suffice it to say, not
only is the proportionality requirement not novel, but it is
embedded in even those decisions understood to be the most
solicitous of Congress's Section 5 power and championed even by
the most liberal Justices.
C.

The Other Arena Involving ProportionalRemedies for
ConstitutionalViolations:Affirmative Action

Subsequent
Supreme
Court
decisions
implicating
governmental attempts to remedy racial discrimination have
wrestled with the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the
proportionality between means and ends, but the essential
necessity of a means-end fit analysis has never been questioned in
these cases, let alone jettisoned. In City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.,52 the Court held that whenever a state or local
government engages in race-based distinctions, the government is
required to prove that the means chosen are "narrowly tailored"
to the end in view. 3 In response to the claim that it had violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection guarantees, the
City of Richmond was required to prove a "nexus between [the]
scope [of its set-aside plan] and [the] factual basis" on which it
rested and to demonstrate that its actions were "necessary" for the
end to be achieved." The Court held that the City woefully failed
this exacting standard.55
48

Id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring).

49 Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring).
50 Id. at 552 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

See id.
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
53 See id. at 509.
54 Id. at 495.
55 See id. at 508.
51
52
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A year later, the Court took its cue from Fullilove, rather than
Croson, and held in Metro Broadcastingv. FCC56 that intermediate
scrutiny applies when the federal government engages in set-aside
programs to remedy past racial discrimination. In upholding the
minority preference policies of the Federal Communications
Commission, the Court applied a rule that required the
government to prove that its scheme was "substantially related to
achievement of [its] objective[s]. 5 7 A vigorous dissent by Justice
O'Connor criticized the majority for the laxity of its standard,
proposing instead that the federal government should be required
to prove that its laws are "narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling interest."58
Justice O'Connor's dissent in Metro Broadcasting,advocating
a tough proportionality standard, became law when the Court
decided Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.59 In that case, the
Court continued to hew to a proportionality requirement, but
rejected intermediate means-end analysis in favor of strict
proportionality review when governments engage in race-based
The Court explicitly rejected the standards
distinctions.60
announced in Fullilove and Metro Broadcasting,to the extent that
they failed to employ strict scrutiny.61 In a disarmingly frank
explanation, Justice O'Connor explained that strict proportionality
review is a tool the Court employs in order to "smoke out"
unconstitutionality.62 In the words of the Court, "requiring strict
scrutiny is the best way to ensure the courts will consistently give
racial classifications [a] detailed examination, both as to ends and
as to means."63
Against this background, the measured and dispassionate
proportionality discussion in the majority opinion in Boerne
should have come as no surprise. The Court once again embraced
proportionality, or means-end, review.64 This time, however, the
Act under review was so disproportionate that the Court had
occasion to reach a new conclusion based on the use of its
entrenched proportionality test. The defenders of RFRA claimed
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
Id. at 564 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 488 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)).
56
57

58

Id. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

59

515 U.S. 200 (1995).

60

See id. at 236.

61

See id at 237.

62

Id. at 226.

63

Id. at 236.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).

64
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that it was remedial-an attempt to enforce threatened
constitutional violations. 65
The Court employed the
proportionality requirement to determine that the Act was not
remedial, but rather a unilateral attempt to amend the
Constitution. 66 The Court reasoned that the means chosen and the
ends identified were so out of whack that the Act could not be
remedial: "The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects
a lack of proportionality or congruence between the means
adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved. '67 According to
the Court, this disproportionality was the Act's "most serious
68
shortcoming."
Ironically, RFRA's severe disproportionality permitted the
Boerne Court to avoid the debate, carved out in Fullilove and its
progeny, over the level of scrutiny to be applied in the means-end
analysis; the Act was so evidently disproportionate that it would
fail under any level of scrutiny. Thus, the level of scrutiny to be
used for the means-end fit requirement in Section 5 cases not
involving race-based distinction remains open. Without question,
however, some level of scrutiny is required. That fact was
reinforced by the Supreme Court's recent decision in College
Savings Bank, where the Court reasserted its allegiance to
proportionality analysis, including the requirement that the
remedy under Section 5 can only be justified by a finding of state
69
wrongdoing.
The Court required proportionality in Boerne and College
Savings Bank to achieve the same effect as in Croson-to "smoke
out" unconstitutional legislative actions. In Boerne, it was not
racial discrimination that was to be discovered by proportionality
review. Rather, the Court examined whether Congress had
exceeded its enumerated powers, thus violating federalism
principles, or whether it had trenched upon the domain of the
courts, thus violating separation of powers principles.70 In College
Savings Bank, Section 5 proportionality review smoked out
violations of the Eleventh Amendment. The lesson to be learned
is that when Congress acts under Section 5 without a particularized
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (stating that under RFRA's approach, "[s]hifting
legislative authorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the
difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V").
67 Id. at 533.
68 Id. at 509, 531-32.
69 See Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S.
Ct. 2199, 2207 (1999).
70 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520-24, 529.
65

66
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focus on the constitutional violations that it seeks to remedy, it is
likely to trespass upon prerogatives of other branches of the
federal government, the states, or the people.71
Having identified the proportionality thread in the Court's
cases treating remedial legislation, we now turn to the law of
remedies to explain the legal and theoretical basis for the
proportionality requirement.
II.

THE LAW OF REMEDIES AND PROPORTIONALITY

The law of remedies rests upon two foundational principles
explicitly invoked in Boerne. First, remedies are supposed to
enforce the law violated, not create a new law. In Boerne, the
Court surveyed its "treatment of Congress' § 5 power as corrective
or preventive, not definitional .... Any suggestion that Congress
has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth
Amendment is not supported by our case law."72 Second, remedies
must be in proportion to threatened or existing violations.73 These
central remedial principles apply across the board-to
compensatory damages,74 disgorgement of ill-gotten gains,75 and
injunctions.76
A.

Remedies, Including Section 5 Remedies, Must Enforce the
Law Violated, Not Create New Law

In accordance with the first remedial principle, injunctions
must seek to enforce the law that the defendant has violated, or
threatens to violate, not to change it. Professor Douglas Laycock,
RFRA's chief author and advocate in the courts, has emphasized
71

See Marci A. Hamilton, Boerne v. Flores: A Landmark for Structural Analysis, 39

WM.& MARY L. REV. 699 (1998) [hereinafter Hamilton, Landmark for Structural

Analysis].
72 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525-27.
73 See id. at 530.
74 As the first case in Professor Laycock's casebook demonstrates, compensatory
damages are supposed to award the plaintiff precisely the amount of funds needed to buy
what was lost through the violation. See DOUGLAS F. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN
REMEDIES, CASES AND MATERIALS 16 (2d ed. 1994); United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d
920 (10th Cir. 1958). The aim is "the plaintiff's rightful position"-the position that the
plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had obeyed the law being enforced. See
LAYCOCK, supra, at 16. Thus, in accordance with the first of the two remedial principles,
compensatory damages are designed to enforce the law of liability, not change it.
Moreover, in strict accordance with the second principle, the remedy is measured by the
wrong.
75 Relief designed to force a defendant to disgorge ill-gotten gains is measured by the
defendant's rightful position. See LAYCOCK, supra note 74, at 16. Again, this remedy
honors both remedial principles.
76 See discussion infra notes 83-116 and accompanying text.
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in his writings on remedies that an injunction must seek to achieve
"the plaintiff's rightful position."" To illustrate, in Mount Healthy
City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 8 although a
school board violated the First Amendment by basing its refusal to
renew a teacher's contract partly upon the content of his speech,
the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's order restoring the
teacher to his job. The Court explained that "[t]he constitutional
principle at stake is sufficiently vindicated if such an employee is
placed in no worse a position than if he had not engaged in the
conduct." 9 The case was then remanded to the district court for a
determination on whether the teacher would have been fired
absent unconstitutional motives.
Although enacted in the name of protecting the right to
religious freedom, RFRA was, from the beginning, an effort to
change
the "rightful
position"-the
Supreme
Court's
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause-rather than an
attempt to enforce it. As such, it violated this first remedial
principle: that remedies are supposed to enforce the law, not
expand it.80 As RFRA's legislative history shows, and the Court
explicitly recognized, Congress attempted to enact a constitutional
amendment by statute rather than enact a statute to enforce
existing constitutional guarantees: "[RFRA] appears.., to
81
attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections.
B.

Remedies Must Be Proportionalto Violations Discovered

Prophylactic rules play a role in injunctive remedies, but one
strictly limited, unsurprisingly, by the concept of proportionality.
In the Court's words in Boerne: "The appropriateness of remedial
measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. Strong
measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted
response to another, lesser one." 82 This principle is nicely reflected
in Professor Laycock's analysis of remedies law:
Specific relief should be generally available for proven harms,
but specific relief should not be an occasion for a court to
remedy harms that it would not compensate with the equivalent
damage remedy. If a harm is not sufficiently connected to the
wrong to justify submitting a damage issue to the jury, it is hard
77 LAYCOCK, supra note 74, at 285-86.
78 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
79 Id. at 285-86.
80 Professor Schoenbrod takes no position on whether the Supreme Court has

interpreted the Free Exercise Clause correctly.
81 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
82 Id. at 530.
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to see how it justifies an injunction. But if there is a functional
reason to reach further with injunctions than with damages, the
proponents of such relief should state that reason explicitly.83
The Solicitor General tried to rescue RFRA by invoking this
principle and arguing that the Act was not a constitutional
amendment, but rather an attempt to enforce the First
Amendment, incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment,
as interpreted by the Court.8 4 On this theory, the statute sought to
prevent covert violations of the First Amendment by laying down
prophylactic rules."'
Under the second remedial principle, a remedy must be
proportional to the violation threatened. A court may grant an
injunction that gives the plaintiff more than its rightful position, but
only if necessary to achieve the plaintiff's rightful position. For
example, in Mount Healthy, the relief that the Supreme Court granted
went beyond the plaintiff's rightful position, but not nearly as far as
the injunction that it reversed. 86 The teacher's rightful position was
to have the school board decide whether to renew his contract
without taking his protected speech into account. 7 Moreover, the
teacher had no right to have the board show cause for refusing to
But an injunction strictly tailored to
renew his contract. 88
plaintiff's rightful position would run the risk that the board would
covertly continue to base his firing on the content of his speech.
As a prophylactic against such covert subversion of the First
Amendment, the Supreme Court directed the school board to
explain to the district court why it would have fired him absent
unconstitutional motives.89 Thus, the teacher got more than his
rightful position; the school board would have to show cause for
refusing to renew the teacher's contract and the final decision
would be made by the district court rather than his enemies on the
school board.
The case law can be synthesized in the following terms:
The injunction should require the defendant to achieve the
plaintiff's rightful position unless (a) different relief is
83 Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 77

(1993).
84 See Brief for the United States at 26-35, Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No.
95-2074).

85 See id. The Court found this reading of RFRA untenable. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at
519.
See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
See id. at 285-86.
88 See id. at 285.
89 See id. at 286.
86
87
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consistent with the goals of the violated rule and (b) the case

involves a factor justifying departure from the [violated] rule
that was not reflected in its formulation [such as an undue risk
that the defendant would covertly violate a narrowly drafted
injunction or undue hardship], but the injunction may never aim
to achieve more than the plaintiff's rightful position. 90
If there were any way to square RFRA with understandings
derived from the law of remedies, it would have to be that the Act
was intended to put religious organizations in better than their
rightful positions in order to ensure that they are not covertly
cheated out of their protected rights. This argument was made by
Professor Laycock and the federal government before the
Supreme Court; they argued that RFRA was necessary in order to
protect minority religions from constitutional violations. 91 Their
argument backfired because RFRA was far broader than was
needed to achieve this purpose. The Act protected every religion
from every government action. The Act's enormous breadth made
clear that the minority religion defense was a pretext for
overreaching.
The prophylactic remedial power is available only after a
finding that the defendant is likely to violate plaintiff's rights. This
bedrock remedies principle is explicitly articulated in Boerne:
"Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be
appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws
affected by the congressional enactment have a significant
'92
likelihood of being unconstitutional.
A court may not simply issue an injunction to prevent future
violations, even one that goes no further than plaintiff's rightful
position, without finding that defendant is likely to violate
plaintiff's rights. Even if some future violations are likely, an
injunction may not be. For example, in Hecht Company v.
Bowles,93 the Hecht Company had inadvertently violated war time
price controls.94 The company, however, was sensitive to being the
target of an injunction against price-gouging in wartime
90 David Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace
Balancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 664 (1988).
Professor Dan Dobbs identifies this formulation as the "Schoenbrod principle." See DAN
B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 181-82 (2d ed. 1993). Professor Laycock has signaled his
agreement with its substance. See LAYCOCK, supra note 74, at 17.

91 See Brief for the United States at 29-32, Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No.
95-2074); Brief for Respondent at 6-43, Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (No. 952074).
92 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997).
93 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
94 See id. at 325-26.

1999]

THE REAFFIRMATION OFPROPORTIONALITY

483

Washington. It pled that the original violations were unintentional
and convinced the district court that it would try assiduously to
avoid future violations. 95 Although the Supreme Court found that
future violations were all but inevitable, given the complexity of
the price regulations and the size of Hecht's inventory, it directed
that an injunction should not be issued automatically. 96 Instead, it
held that the courts below should exercise equitable discretion. It
is clear from the Court's discussion that the lower courts were
supposed to consider whether an injunction would really decrease
97
future violations.
The plaintiff must show even more to get an injunction that
goes beyond its rightful position. In Hutto v. Finney,98 the district
court had found that punitive isolation in a prison for longer than
thirty days was not, in itself, cruel and unusual punishment, but did
rise to such level when compounded by the harsh conditions in
Arkansas's punitive isolation cells. 99 The district court nonetheless
enjoined punitive isolation for longer than thirty days without
regard to the conditions in the cells, and the Supreme Court
affirmed:
In fashioning a remedy, the District Court had ample authority
to go beyond earlier orders and to address each element
contributing to the violation. The District Court had given the
Department repeated opportunities to remedy the cruel and
unusual conditions in the isolation cells. If petitioners had fully
complied with the court's earlier orders, the present time limit
[on the period in isolation cells] might well have been
unnecessary. But taking the long and unhappy history of the
litigation into account, the court was justified in entering a
comprehensive order to insure against the risk of inadequate
compliance.100
Thus, in order to issue an injunction that goes beyond plaintiff's
rightful position, the court must find not only a threat of future
violations, but also that an order tailored to plaintiff's rightful
position will not adequately insure compliance.10 1
As Professor William Fletcher has pointed out, in institutional
reform cases against governments, courts ordinarily begin with an
injunction narrowly tailored to plaintiff's rightful position,
95
96
97
98

See id. at 326.
See id. at 331.
See id. at 324-26.
437 U.S. 678 (1978).

99 See id. at 685.
Id. at 687.

100

101 See Schoenbrod, supra note 90, at 678-80.
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broadening the injunctions only if the defendants merit harsher
treatment-and even then, only in stages. 10 2 He argues that this
careful approach is necessary so that courts do not affront
principles of federalism and separation of powers. 03 The lack of
proportionality between means and ends in RFRA led the Court
to conclude that Congress had violated both principles of
federalism and separation of powers.104
The school desegregation cases provide further support for
the principle that injunction should be in proportion to the threat
to plaintiff's rights. As the Court stated in Milliken v. Bradley I:
[T]he nature of the desegregation remedy is to be determined
by the nature and scope of the violation. Swann. The remedy
must therefore be related to the 'the condition alleged to offend
the Constitution.... ' Milliken L Second, the decree must
indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be designed as
nearly as possible 'to restore the victims of discriminatory
conduct to the position they would have occupied in the
absence of such conduct.' Milliken I. Third, the federal courts
in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of
state and local authorities in10 managing
their own affairs,
5
consistent with the Constitution.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits de jure, but not de facto, segregation,
the Court suggests school desegregation orders should be designed
"to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation"
and incorporate specific strategies to that end. 10 6 These colorconscious remedies for violations of a provision of the Constitution
that creates a strong presumption against color-conscious
government action have been justified by the need to repair past
violations and to prevent future, covert violations. As Dean Peter
Shane argues: "Where minority students are systematically
vulnerable to hostile or insensitive treatment, the racial separation
of
schools effectively subjugates minority students in the
competition for educational resources and deprives them of any
basis for reasonable confidence in the evenhanded administration
of their schools."'0 7 Indeed, the Supreme Court did not call for
102 See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 638 (1982).

See id. at 637.
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-36 (1997).
Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (citations omitted).
106 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
107 Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of
Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041,1043 (1984).
103
104
105
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broad race-conscious remedies until the defendant school boards
had demonstrated their unwillingness to comply with more
narrowly tailored relief.10 8 Similarly, the Supreme Court is willing
to terminate school desegregation orders, or cut them back, as the
threat of future violations is dissipated by prolonged compliance
with the injunction.109
It is, of course, true that some school desegregation
injunctions have produced sharp splits in the Supreme Court. The
fights, however, have been over how to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause, not over whether injunctions can be used for
some purpose beyond the enforcement and prevention of
constitutional violations. 110
Not everyone agrees with the Supreme Court's understanding
of the remedial power. Professor Abram Chayes argued in a
famous article that, once a violation has been found in a public law
case, the judge should be free to fashion relief to take account of
the broad public interests."' Chayes writes: "At this point, right
and remedy are pretty thoroughly disconnected. 112 However, the
Supreme Court has rejected Professor Chayes's vision of the judge
as, in essence, a legislator in robes, even as he, himself, later
acknowledged." 3
While it is possible to argue that Professor Chayes is right and
the Court is wrong,'14 it is impossible to argue that the Court's
concept in Boerne-of what it means to remedy or enforce-came
out of left field, or right field, for that matter.
C.

The Relevance of Remedial Principles to Section 5

The remedial powers of federal courts are hedged in by
separation of powers and federalism concerns. The holding and
opinion in Boerne make clear that Section 5 remedies are also
restricted by these fundamental, structural constitutional
108

See Swann, 402 U.S. at 1; see also Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).

109 See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Board of Educ. of Okla. City Pub.

Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
110 See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 115 (1995); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 467; Dowell,
498 U.S. at 237.
11 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976).
112

Id. at 1293.

See Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982).
114 We know of no evidence that Professor Laycock sided with Professor Chayes prior
to Boerne. Professor Laycock's disciplined approach to courts' injunctive power is, if
anything, quite contrary to that of Professor Chayes. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 83, at
77.
113
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features." 5 One of us (Schoenbrod) has articulated how courts
decide whether, when a legislature enacts a rule of conduct, they
must enforce the rule to the letter, or whether they retain
traditional equitable power to do more or less.1 6 That articulation
provides a background understanding against which statutes
should be interpreted unless the legislature clearly states another
intention."7 Similarly, the law of remedies helps to provide a
background understanding of what it means to "enforce" a right
within the meaning of Section 5.
The Supreme Court should not give Congress more latitude in
determining whether it has exceeded its remedial power under
Section 5 than the Court grants lower courts in determining
whether they have exceeded their remedial power. Of course, the
Court is deferential to Congress in findings of fact, as it is
deferential to the lower courts' factual determination. Such
deference should not be taken as a license for Congress or the
lower courts to exceed their powers. Rather, this deference takes
account of the reality that legislators and trial court judges have,
each in their own ways, access to information and insights not
readily available to the Supreme Court.
Indeed, there are reasons to suppose that Congress, in
formulating legislative remedies under Section 5, should be held to
a higher standard of justification than are trial court judges in
formulating judicial remedies. First, Congress is better able to
gather the facts showing the need for prophylactic remedies. The
trial judge is limited to the record built by the parties. In contrast,
Congress can draw upon its own investigatory resources and, in
most instances, those of the executive branch. With Congress's
fact finding resources and latitude, it is not unreasonable to
enforce the proportionality requirement, especially when that
requirement hedges against congressional usurpation of Article V
amendment procedures.
Second, Congress is far less
circumscribed than are the courts in reaching conclusions of fact
needed to justify a prophylactic remedy; Congress is not bound by
evidentiary rules and the requirement to base its findings on the
record. Third, Congress has more latitude in crafting remedies,
and is, therefore, better able to craft remedies narrowly tailored to
the threat presented.118 The fourth and final reason is that
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533-36 (1997).
See supra text accompanying note 90.
117 See Schoenbrod, supra note 90, at 681-82.
118 Cf. Peter H. Schuck, The New Judicial Ideology of Tort Law, in NEW DIRECTIONS
IN LIABILITY LAW 4, 15-16 (Walter Olson ed., 1988).
115

116
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remedies under Section 5 are far more powerful than those issued
by a trial judge. A trial judge's injunction binds only the parties to
that case and their privies. In contrast, legislative remedies under

Section 5 can bind the whole country. For example, RFRA
established a new free exercise standard for all governments at
every level throughout the United States. 119
III.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

Proportionality review is part and parcel of the Court's
increasingly close attention to structural principles.2 0 If Congress
were permitted to enact rules that it calls "prophylactic" without
any proportionality review, it could increase its power under
Section 5 geometrically. For example, in the name of equal
protection, Congress could require courts to apply heightened
scrutiny to protect any group with sufficient political power to get
the attention of legislators, and thereby mandate state and local
government to confer benefits on that group. In the name of
protecting free speech, Congress could prevent state and local
government from zoning or licensing pornography shops out of
residential neighborhoods. 121 It could unilaterally force Tennessee
and California to accept the same definition of obscenity.2 2 In the
119 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(1) (1994) (defining "government" as "[a] branch,
department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of
law) of the United States, a State, or a subdivision of a State .... ).
120 The proportionality and congruence requirement has been applied in the following
cases since Boerne: Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999) (discussing
lack of proportionality and congruence); Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and
Correctional Servs., 178 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding congruence and proportionality)
(petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc pending); Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d
430 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that the ADA met the proportionality requirements); Clark v.
California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the ADA satisfies the
congruence/proportionality requirement); Pease v. University of Cincinnati. Med. Ctr., 6
F. Supp. 2d. 706 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (stating that the ADEA satisfies the proportionality and
congruence requirements); Kish v. Verniero, 212 B.R. 808 (1997) (finding lack of
proportionality and congruence in bankruptcy law); see also Hamilton, Landmark for
Structural Analysis, supra note 71.
121 Of course, Section 5 only provides the power to regulate state and local
governments. See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the
Fox Into the Henhouse Under the Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16
CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 374 (1994) [hereinafter Hamilton, Henhouse]. Regulation of the
federal government arises only under Article I. See id. at 364; see also FW/PBS v. City of
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 229 (1990) (striking a zoning and licensing ordinance as a prior
restraint to the First Amendment); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 54-55
(1986) (upholding ability to zone entertainment away from residential neighborhoods).
122 In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973), the Court upheld "contemporary
community standards" as the national criteria to determine whether a trier of fact would
find that the work appealed to the prurient interest.
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name of protecting property, Congress could prevent state and
local government from responding to environmental threats left
unaddressed by federal environmental law, or could tell
communities that they may not protect their shared history
through historical preservation. 123
That Congress does not always avail itself of the opportunity
to enact bad laws is no answer to this parade of horribles. How it
and other governmental institutions act depends very much on the
ground rules of politics under which they operate. For that reason,
the Framers of the Constitution sought to structure a system of
government that would discourage arbitrary laws and
infringements on liberty by dividing power between the discrete
power centers within the society, and by making political actors
accountable for the consequences of their choices.
Professor Michael McConnell has argued that Congress, when
acting under Section 5, "is not bound by the institutional
constraints that in many cases lead the courts to adopt a less
intrusive interpretation from among the textually and historically
plausible meanings of the clause in question. ' 124 His reasoning
rests on the strange notion that "Congress need not be concerned
that its interpretations of the Bill of Rights will trench upon
democratic prerogatives, because its actions are the expression of
the people.' 25 On his skewed understanding of the Constitution,
"the Boerne Court overturned the 'will of the people.' 1 26
This view rests on two common errors. First, representatives
are not the people, but rather hold independent decision making
authority distinct from the people. 127
Their decisions are
constitutionally legitimate, no matter how far they stray from the
people's wishes, so long as they do not cross constitutional
boundaries. Thus, they hold tremendous power, both to do good
and to trample on the people's liberties. The circumstances
surrounding RFRA reveal the flaw in assuming that legislation is
the will of the people; the people knew little if anything about it.12s
Second, the Constitution does not sanction any lawmaking
123 See, e.g., Brooks M. Beard, The New Environmental Federalism: Can The EPA's
Voluntary Audit Policy Survive?, 17 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 27 (1997) (discussing state

privilege legislation curbing a state's ability to enforce environmental laws).
124 McConnell, supra note 2, at 156.
125 Id.
Id. at 168.
See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace
the Myth of Self-Rule with an Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
126
127

477, 480 (1994); Marci A. Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U CHI.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (1997) [hereinafter Hamilton, The People].
128 See Marci A. Hamilton, Religion's Reach, 1997 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 644.
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that is "the expression of the people." 12 9 All laws are supposed to
be made through legislative filtering, 130 or, if constitutional
amendments, through supermajorities of Congress and the
states."' The Framers made it quite clear that the people's views
require filtering.'32 In short, Professor McConnell's foundational
presumptions are simply incorrect. Congress is just as dangerous
when it is tinkering with constitutional protections under Section 5
as when it is engaged in Article I lawmaking.
Without proportionality review in Section 5 jurisprudence,
Congress could change the ground rules of government built into
the Constitution in five fundamental ways. First, Congress would
become, in effect, a legislature with unlimited, rather than
enumerated, powers. Second, Congress would have increased
power to impose unfunded mandates directly on state and local
government, even in their core policy making functions.'33 Third,
Congress would, in effect, have the power to revise the Court's
interpretation of rights to make them more "protective"-at the
expense, of course, of other groups. Since there is no vacuum of
power in our society, every time the lines of power are redrawn,
some benefit and others do not. 3 4 Fourth, Congress could take
credit for conferring new rights without taking responsibility for
the concomitant costs, by forcing the executive branch or the states
to carry out its edicts.135 Finally, Congress could impose on
unelected judges the hard policy choices necessitated by the
inevitable need to strike a balance between costs and benefits.
The Court did succumb to political pressure in the days of the
Court-packing plan because the country was desperate during the
129

See Hamilton, The People, supra note 127.

130

See U.S. CONST. art. I (mandating that lawmaking powers of the federal

government lodge in the legislative branch); id. art. IV, § 4 (Guaranty Clause).
131

See id. art. V.

132 See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
83-88 (Adrienne Koch ed. 1966); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 72 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982) ("(T)he passions of men will not conform to the dictates

of reason without constraint.").
133 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid PostSecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999). See generally Elizabeth Garrett,
Enhancing the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113 (1997) (discussing the importance of allowing the political
system to keep federalism in check).
134 This was the intent of the Framers. "It is obviously impracticable in the federal
government of these States to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet
provide for the interest and safety of all-Individuals entering into society must give up a
share of liberty to preserve the rest." MADISON, supra note 132, at 627 (letter to Congress
accompanying a draft of the Constitution).
135 See Hamilton, Henhouse, supra note 121, at 378-86.
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Great Depression, and the Court had in fact used constitutional
review to try to impose its policy preferences on the political
branches.136 Proportionality review rightly applied, however, does
not second-guess congressional policy. Rather, it requires that
Congress make policy within its enumerated powers. Far from
subverting democratic accountability, proportionality review
protects it by ensuring that politicians cannot change the ground
rules of government to avoid responsibility and to serve powerful
interests.
RFRA, whatever the good intentions behind it,
exemplifies congressional avoidance of responsibility.'37
The Supreme Court must enforce the formalistic boundaries
established by the Constitution if it is to protect the Constitution's
structure without second guessing policy. 3 s Good fences make
good neighbors, and they are essential for democratic
accountability and liberty. If the Supreme Court is to be faulted, it
is for not going far enough to enforce such boundaries. For
example, the Court has wavered over the years in its enforcement
of the nondelegation doctrine,'39 which is, nevertheless, an
136 See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (rejecting
direct/indirect effect on interstate commerce distinction to uphold National Labor
Relations Act); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state
minimum wage statute); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936)
(holding state minimum wage law unconstitutional as violating due process); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935 for infringing on power of the states); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding unconstitutional National Industrial Recovery Act).
137 The record of constitutional violations undergirding the Religious Liberty
Protection Act of 1999, which invokes Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
federalize local land use laws is little improvement over the record developed regarding
RFRA. See, e.g., Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearings on H.R. 1691 Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 1 0 5 'h Cong., May
12, 1999, available in 1999 WL 304868 (testimony of Steven T. McFarland, Christian Legal
Society); id. at 304682 (testimony of Douglas Laycock); id. at 304853 (testimony of Rabbi
David Saperstein, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism); id. at 304846 (testimony
of Von G. Keetch, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints); id. at 304842 (testimony
of J. Brent Walker, on behalf of the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs); see also
Religious Liberty ProtectionAct of 1999: Hearings on S. 2148 Before the Subcomm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong., June 23, 1999, available in 1999 WL 416833 (testimony of Nathan
B. Diament, Institute for Public Affairs, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of
America); id. (testimony of Elliot M. Mincberg, People for the American Way); id. at
416832 (testimony of Steven T. McFarland, Christian Legal Society). It is anecdotal and
runs counter to objective studies done on the issue. See, e.g., Mark Chaves & William
Tsitsos, Are Congregations Constrained by Government? Empirical Results from the
National Congregations Study, University of Arizona (visited Nov. 8, 1999)
<http:\\www.marcihamilton.com/rlpa/landuse.html>.
138 See generally Marci A. Hamilton, Buried Voices, Dominant Themes: Justice Hans
Linde and the Move to Structural ConstitutionalInterpretation, 35 WILLAMETIE L. REV.
167 (1999).
139 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 155-95 (1993); see also Amicus Curiae
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important element of the Court's emerging structural orientation.
In the Court's words: "Another strand of our separation of powers
jurisprudence, the delegation doctrine, has developed to prevent
Congress from forsaking its duties.... The fundamental precept
of the delegation doctrine is that the lawmaking function belongs
to the Congress.' 140
The proportionality requirement also
encourages Congress to engage in its lawmaking function with
integrity and care.
CONCLUSION

The Constitution is structured so that policy makers can
exercise their power only through pre-ordained mechanisms
designed to make them accountable in specific ways. The current
Supreme Court continues to underscore this point.
The Court's renewed vigor in enforcing proportionality in
College Savings Bank and Boerne is simply further evidence that
the Court is turning towards structural principles in its review of
legislative action. 4' At one time, the Court's use of the means-end
fit requirement was subject to the criticism that it was a subterfuge
to assess the policy justifications for the statute. 142
The
proportionality test is a tool for divining when Congress is acting
according to its constitutional role.
Proportionality review, and its presupposition that remedies
must redress existing wrongs, forces Congress to justify its flights
of policy that invade the states' and the courts' domains. The
Court has implemented this time-honored tool from the law of

Brief in Support of Appellees at 8-19, Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (No. 96-1671)
(describing history of the Court's nondelegation doctrine).
140 United States v. Loving, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996).
141 The best examples of this contemporary turn are Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240,
2267 (1999); College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 2219, 2224 (1999); Florida Prepaid Post-Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2206 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507

(1997); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986);
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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(Robert

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:469

remedies to uncover the often wily means by which the most
dangerous branch, the legislature, 113 can creep beyond its
constitutional bounds.

The Framers feared the legislature most. "The legislature will continually seek to
aggrandize & perpetuate themselves; and will seize those critical moments produced by
war, invasion or convulsion for that purpose." MADISON, supra note 132, at 322
(statement of Gouverneur Morris).
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